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This statute should be amended to include all child custody cases, not
just those that are the result of divorce proceedings.
The best interests of the child test is based on vague standards.
Standards such as moral fitness, comparative physical environments
and emotional ties are very difficult to define. These standards can
also be very subjective due to the wide discretionary power of the
judge. The best interests of the child test could become, in the dis-
cretion of a particular trial judge, a financial best interest test. If a
judge subjectively decided that a factor of physical environment such
as wealth was the most important interest of the child then the party
with the most financial resources would be awarded custody.
The best interests of the child test is inevitably artificial and tends
to reach unfair and even vicious results when applied in fact
unless one uses this test as a philosophical concept, and thinks of
the child in an abstract or ideal sense, as an Hegelian might do.37
An advisory committee working with the trial judge would be more
likely to be objective in a custody award than the trial judge alone.
Only by a thorough investigation of the best interests of all the parties
can parental rights and the child's best interests be balanced to
determine the award of custody to the proper party.
William Edward Hudson
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-KENTucKx's 'hIvTLrED CoNSENT" STATUE-BE-
vocATiNo OF MoToR VEmCr= OPERATog's LICENSE FOR REFUSAL TO TA E
BLOOD ALCOHOL TEsT.--"There has been a long felt need for further
legislation to clear the highways . . . of the intoxicated driver. A
mounting toll yearly in injured and dead has been his responsibility."'
The drinking driver creates a serious threat to the safety and protection
of lives of persons on our nation's highways. Several studies indicate
that ten to fifteen percent of all accidents involve a drinking driver,
and fifty percent of the drivers judged to be at fault in fatal accidents
have been drinking.2
37 Sayre, supra note 7, at 683.
1 Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, -, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121 (Sup. Ct.
1954). For other cases in which the problem of the drinking driver has been
noted, see Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, -, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, -, 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1956); State v.
Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, -, 202 A.2d 267, 269 (1964).
2 HOUSE Comm. oN PUBLIC Wonxs, 90TH CONG., 2D Sass., 1968 Aiconor.
ANDHIGHvAY SAFETY REPoRT 11-15 (Comm. Print 1968); Ky. LEGisL&TIvERE-
sEAECn CommissioN, TRAFFIC SArTY: THz DRUI ING Draim, PmEECH REPORT
No. 36 at 2, 9 (Sept. 1967).
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In reaction to this problem, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have made it a criminal violation to drive while under the
influence of alcohol; forty-four states and the District of Columbia
allow the evidence obtained from chemical tests to determine intoxi-
cation.3 To further aid in the detection of the drinking driver and in
the enforcement of "drunk driver" statutes, thirty-five states, including
Kentucky, have passed "implied consent" legislation.
4
Under the theory of implied consent, any person who operates a
motor vehicle on the state's highways5 is deemed to have given his
consent to a chemical test of his blood, breath, urine, or saliva for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, whenever
he is arrested for any affense involving the operation of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Refusal to
submit to a test for intoxication results in the revocation of the opera-
tor's license.
The underlying rationale is:
[T]o operate a motor vehicle on a public road is not a natural or
unrestricted right but rather a privilege granted by the state and
subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the
state. Such a license is issued and accepted under the terms and
conditions of the statute.0
3 Alabama, Alaska, California, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Oklahoma do
not have chemical test statutes governing the evidentiary presumptions of in-
toxication based on the alcohol-blood ratio. UNmroam VExmcLE CODE ANN. §
11-902(b) (Supp. 1969).4 Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (Supp. May 1969); CAL. Vii. CODE §
13353 (West Supp. 1968); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-5-30 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 14-11Tb (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322-261 (1968); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-1625.1 (Supp. 1968); HAI wI REv. LAws § 286-151 (1968); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49-352 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95V § 144 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2003c (Supp. 1969); IowA CODE § 321.B3
(Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (Supp. 1968); Ky. REv. STAT. § 186.565
(1968); LA. REv. STAT. § 32:661 (Supp. 1970); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90,
§24 (Supp. 1969); MIcH. Co M. LAws § 257.625 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.123 (Supp. 1968); Mo. REv. STAT. § 564.441 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REv.
STAT.. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2.4 (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. VEm. & TRAn. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
20-139.1 (Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1969); OHmo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1968); OELA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 751 (Supp.
1968); OnE. REv. STAT. § 483.634 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1 (Supp.
1969); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (1969); S.D. CODE § 44.0302-2 (Supp.
1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 §
1188 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-1-55.1 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1969).
5 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 186.565(1) (1968):
Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state is deemed to have
given his consent.... [Emphasis added.]
6 Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Ky. 1962); accord,
Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1957); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141
(Ky. 1951); Withers v. Marshall, 311 Ky. 659, 225 S.W.2d 121 (1949); Com-
monwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S.W.2d 579 (1939). For cases of other
(Continued on next page)
1970]
KENTucC LAw JouRNAL
The United States Supreme Court in upholding the validity of the
Massachusetts non-resident motorist statute, a form of implied consent,
ruled that "in advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its high-
ways ... the state may require" the operator to consent to reasonable
conditions to the exercise of this privilege.7
There have been few challenges to implied consent legislation on
the basis of the state's power to regulate the use of the highways
and none have been successful. 8 The courts have looked favorably
on these statutes and have consistently rejected constitutional chal-
lenges.9
The first implied consent law was enacted by the New York State
Legislature in 1953 and amended in 1954 to meet judicial criticism.10
This amended act was incorporated into a "Uniform Chemical Test
for Intoxication Act" which was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in July 1957. These recom-
mendations were adopted by the National Committee on Uniform
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
jurisdictions which reiterate this settled principle of law, see Lee v. State, 187
Kan. 566, -, 358 P.2d 765, 769 (1961); Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284
289 (Mo. 1967); Prucha v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, -, 110 N.W.2d
75, 81 (1961) (not a property right); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, -- 127
N.Y.S.2d 116, 121-22, (Sup. Ct. 1955); Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40, - 130
N.W.2d 423, 424 (1964); State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, -, 202 A.2d 267, 269
(1964) (not a property right).
7 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
8 DONIGAN, C EmicAL TESTS AN THE LAw 1 (1966).
9 The first implied consent statute enacted by the New York State Legisla-
ture in 1953, was held unconstitutionaf in Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127
N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Amended to require a lawful arrest and an
opportunity to be heard, the revised statute was declared constitutional in
Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955). There-
after, all courts have rejected constitutional contentions that implied consent
statutes:
1) infringe on the guarantee against self-incrimination. Lee v. State, 187
Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961); Prucha v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415,
110 N.W.2d 75 (1961); Schutt v. MacDuffff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
2) violate due process of law. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765
(1961); Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967); Prucha v. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961); Ballou v. Kelly, 12
Misc. 2d 178, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
3) deprive a licensee of equal protection of the laws. Schutt v. MacDuff,
205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
4) permit an unreasonable search and seizure. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432 (1957); State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N.W.2d650 (1966); Lee
v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 385 P.2d 765 (1961); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43,
127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
5) interfere with the right to counsel. Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa
1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966); Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d
427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962).10 N.Y. Vzms. Ars ThAF. LAw § 71-a (McKinney 1953), as amended, ch. 320
1954 N.Y. Laws, now N.Y. VEH. AND TRAF. LAw § 1194 (McKinney 1969). For a
brief judicial history of this statute, see note 9 supra.
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Traffic Laws and Ordinances and included in the Uniform Vehicle
Code in 1962.11 This has become the prototype of all other implied
consent legislation.12
In apparent response to federal standards requiring better highway
safety programs,'3 the 1968 Kentucky General Assembly passed its
implied consent law, Kentucky Revised Statute [hereinafter referred
to as KRS] § 186.565,14 which is modeled after the Uniform Vehicle
Code § 6-205.1. Before the enactment of this statute, Kentucky had
dealt with the problem of the drinking driver by prohibiting his use
of the highways, 5 and by providing for the results of blood alcohol
tests to give rise to evidentiary presumptions of intoxication. 16
'
11UNIFRMn VEHICLEu CODE [hereinafter cited as UVC] § 6-205.1(a) (1962):
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or
tests of his blood, breath, urine or saliva. The test or tests shall be
administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reason-
able grounds to believe that the driver was under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor....
'
2 Compare the statutes cited in note 4 supra with UVC § 6-205.1(a) (1962),
note 11 supra.
's Pursuant to the Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-04 (1966),
the Secretary of Transportation issued a standard requiring each state to develop
and implement programs designed to reduce the number of traffic accidents
caused by motorists who drive while under the influence of alcohol. The
standard, issued June 26, 1967, required each state to (1) strengthen their
"drunk driving" statutes, (2) supplement such statutes with "implied consent'
authority, and (3) establish an expanded information collection program to
determine the extent alcohol is present among drivers and adult pedestrians in-
volved in fatal automobile accidents. H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
9-10 (1967).
14KRS § 186.565(1) (1968):
Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state is deemed to
have given his consent to a chemical test of his blood, breath, urine or
salivia for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood,
if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been com-
mitted while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of intoxicating
beverages....
15 KRS § 189.520 (1968):(1) No person under the influence of intoxicating beverages ...
shall operate a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle anywhere in this state.(2) No person shall operate a motor vehicle anywhere in this state
while under the influence of intoxicating beverages....
1
6 XRS § 189.520(4) (1968):
In any criminal prosecution . .wherein the defendant is charged
with having operated a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
beverages, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood, as determined
at the time of making a chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath or
other bodily substance, shall give rise to the following presumptions:
(a) If there was 0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in such
blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influ-
ence of intoxicating beverages;
(b) If there was more than 0.05 percent, but less than 0.10 percent
by weight of alcohol in such blood, such fact shall not constitute a pre-
(Continued on next page)
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Although no person arrested for operating a motor vehicle 17 while
under the influence of alcohol was to be compelled to submit to a test,
his refusal could be commented on by the prosecution at trial.'5 This
was held to be a violation of the constitutional provisions which
prohibit the compelling of a person to be a witness against himself. 9
Partially to remedy this nullification and to further aid in obtaining
convictions, and more emphatically to bolster the deterrence factor
in an attempt to reduce the number of drinking drivers, the statute
was amended to provide for revocation of the driver's license for
refusal to submit to the test 20 and KRS § 186.565 was enacted to imply
consent.
The first implied consent case to go before the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was Department of Public Safety v. Powers.21 Powers had
been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The
arresting officer "advised ... [Powers] of his right to take a blood
alcohol test . .. if he would like." The officer "offered [Powers] a
blood alcohol test" and asked him "if he would be willing to take a
blood alcohol test." A second officer asked Powers "if he wanted [a
-blood alcohol test]" and told him "he did not have to take it, it was
his privilege." A third officer asked Powers "if he would like to have
a blood alcohol test."22 Under Kentucky's implied consent statute, the
arresting officer filed an affidavit with the Department of Public
Safety [hereinafter Department] stating that Powers had refused to
submit to the test upon his request. The Department revoked Powers'
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
sumption that the defendant either was or was not under the influence
of intoxicating beverages, but such fact may be considered, together with
other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendant;
(c) If there was 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in suchblood, it shail be presumed that the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicating beverages.
'7 Or a vehicle wich is not a motor vehicle. KRS § 189.520(1) (1968).
'
5 KRS § 189.520(6) (1958):
No person may be compelled to submit to any test. ., but his refusalmay be commented upon by the prosecution in the trial against any
person charged with operating any vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.
19 KRS § 186.520 (6) (1958) was held unconstitutional under section eleven
of the Constitution of Kentucky and the fifth amendment of the Constitution of
the United States in Hovious v. Riley, 403 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1966), noted at 55
Ky. L.J. 891 (1967).2 OKRS § 186.520(6) (1968):
No person shall be compelled to submit to any test . . . but his
refusal to submit to such test shall result in revocation of his license as
provided in KRS 186.565(3).
21453 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1970).
22 Id. at 262.
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driver's license for a period of six months.2 3  Power requested
a hearing before the Commissioner of the Department.- At
the hearing,25 the Commissioner found that Powers had refused to
submit to the test upon the request of the officer and entered an
order sustaining the suspension of Powers' license. Powers appealed
to the Calloway Circuit Court26 which found that the Commissioner's
ruling was arbitrary.2 7 Accordingly, the court entered judgment to
set aside the order of suspension of Powers' license. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence at the hearing
before the Commissioner was not sufficient to sustain the finding
that Powers had been requested to take a blood test and had refused.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court found it necessary first to
23KRS § 186.565(3) (1968):
If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law enforce-
ment officer to submit to a chemical test... the Department of Public
Safety, upon a receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer
that had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been
driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state
while under the influence of intoxicating beverages and that the person
refused to submit to the test upon the request of the law enforcement
officer, shall revoke the license or permit of the person refusing to take
the test for a period of not more than six months....
24KRS § 186.565(4) (1968):
...Within ten days after receiving notice [of revocation], the person
may request a hearing before the commissioner ...
25 KRS § 186.565(4) (1968) provides in part:
The scope of the hearing shall cover the issues of whether a law enforce-
ment officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been
driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state
while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, whether the person
was placed under arrest, and whether he refused to submit to the test
upon request of the officer ...
2JKRS § 185.565(5) (1968):
If revocation... is sustained after the hearing, the person whose license
... has been revoked... may file a petition in the circuit court of the
county in which the person resides or in the circuit court of the county
in which the alleged offense was committed or in Franklin Circuit Court
to review the final order of revocation .. .by the commissioner within
twenty days after the final order has been issued ....
27 KRS § 186.565(5) (1968) provides in part:
The [circuit] court's review is limited to whether the commissioner's
ruling is supported by substantial evidence and whether his action is
arbitrary or capricious....
The circuit court found the Commissioner's ruling to be arbitrary on the
grounds that:
(1) the Murray Police Department did not supply the necessary testing
equipment;(2) the Appellee could not have refused since he was never requested to
submit to the test within the meaning of the statute; and
(3) the Appellee offered to take the test within an effective time and the
police refused to administer it to him.
The circuit court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute.
Brief for Appellant at 4, Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Powers, 453
S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1970).
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define the word "request" as used in context with the word "refuse"
in the statute. It was the opinion of the Court that the statute con-
templates:
[S]uch a form of a request as specifically asks the subject person to
take the test, not merely inquires whether the person would like to
take it; one that has more of the elements of a demand than of a
mere offer .... a direct solicitation, an expression of the officers'
desire that the test be taken... The normal form of the request
would be: 'Will you submit to the test?'.. . so phrased as to call for
a response which says 'I will' or "I will not'... a refusal instead of
a mere declination. 28
Although, at first blush, this seems like a technical distinction not
worthy of close analysis, it must be remembered that the driver is
deemed to have given his consent by his act of driving. It follows
that if a person has already consented to a blood test, there is no
purpose for the arresting officer to offer him one or ask if he would
like to have one. To ask implies consent is needed, when consent
has supposedly already been given. Therefore the Court seems to
be saying that the defendant should be demanded to take the test,
and unless he refuses, the test should be administered.
This same issue was before the Court again a week later for its
decision. In applying the semantical rule laid down in Powers, the
Court held in Department of Public Safety v. Cheek29 that the officer's
words ("You are supposed to take a blood alcohol test. . . . Do you
mind taking it?") °30 constituted a proper request. The Court's decision
in these two cases seems to indicate that KRS § 186.565 will be narrowly
construed according to the plain meaning of the words of the statute
itself, and in favor of the license holder.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals adheres to the precise words of
the statute more strictly than the courts of other jurisdictions. The
New York Supreme Court, Orange County, stating dictum in a 1954
case,31 said a driver's license could be revoked "in the event he shall
refuse.., when demanded" to submit to a test. But when the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division squarely faced this issue, it
held that the intent of the statute had been complied with when the
officer asked if the driver "wanted to take a test."32 [emphasis added.]
While the Kentucky Court of Appeals was deciding the Powers
28 Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Powers, 453 S.W.2d 260, 262-63
(Ky. 1970).29 451 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1970).
sod. at 396.31 Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 122 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
82 Clancy v. Kelly, 7 App. Div. 2d 820, 180 N.Y.S.2d 923,- 924 (1958).
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and Cheek cases, the 1970 Kentucky General Assembly was amending
KRS § 186.565 to require the requesting officer to warn the driver
of the effect of his refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test.33 Powers
and Cheek outline a standard to which the officer's request must con-
form under a statute which does not require the officer to warn of
the effect of refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test. Under this
amendment, these two cases serve as a basis from which to speculate
as to what new standard the court will delineate, and what form of
"request" and "warning" will be upheld3 4
The amended statute seems to require, on its face, a request, a
refusal, a warning, another request and another refusal.35 Will the
Court require strict compliance with this procedure or will one
request coupled with a warning and one refusal be sufficient? Al-
though the statutory intent would seemingly be complied with by the
latter form of a warning, the Court will probably require strict com-
pliance with the words of the statute, as it did in the previous two
cases.386
Although many states do not have this statutory requirement, the
courts, nevertheless, have upheld the statutes under due process attacks
and rejected arguments set forth under Miranda v. Arizona.37 But the
courts have often indicated sentiments favoring the giving of such
33 Ch. 238, [1970] Ky. Acts. The significant amendments were made in
subsection (3) of KRS § 186.565 (as italicized):
If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law enforce-
ment officer to submit to a chemical test . . . the requesting officer shall
warn the person of the effect of his refusal to submit to the test. If the
person again refuses, none shall be given, but the Department of Public
Safety, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer
that be-had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person bad
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this
state while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, [and] that the
person refused to submit to the test upon the request of the law enforce-
ment officer, and that the person again refused to submit to the test
after the law enforcement officer warned him of the effect of his refusal,
shall revoke the license or permit of the person refusing to take the test
for a period of not more than six months . . . the sworn report of the
law enforcement officer stating that he had warned the person under arrest
of the effect of his refusal to submit to a chemical test shall be proof
that such warning had been given.
a4 It is assumed that the Court will still require such a form of a request
that has more of the elements of a demand than a mere offer as it did in Powers.
35 For the text of the statute as amended, see note 33 supra.386 Mary Jo Arterberry, counsel for Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety in
Powers and Cheek, agrees with this prediction. Interview with Mary Jo Arter-
berry, counsel for the Ky. Dep't of Public Safety, by telephone, April 1, 1970.
37384 U.S. 436 (1966). For cases which hold that a motorist need not be
advised of the consequences of his failure to submit to a blood alcohol test, see
Hazlett v. Motor Vehicle Dep't, 195 Kan. 439, 407 P.2d 551 (1965); Prucha v.
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961); Anderson v.
MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955); Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d
359 (N.D. 1961).
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warnings and have, by way of dictum, stated that it would be a
better practice for the police to warn of the consequences of refusal.38
In Powers, the constitutional issues raised in the court below were
not grounds for appeal.3 9 Because no mention of these issues was
made in Powers, nor in Cheek, it cannot be presumed that the Court
passed on the constitutionality of the statute sub silentia. In Depart-
ment of Public Safety v. Brent,40 the third implied consent case before
the Court,41 judge Osborne, in a concurring opinion, regretted that
the constitutionality of the statute had not been argued. Citing
Schmerber v. California,42 he expressed serious reservations con-
cerning the distinction made between "physical" and "testimonial"
evidence under the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimi-
nation.
In that landmark case, the Supreme Court of the United States
considered the question of whether the self-incrimination privilege
of the fifth amendment is violated by the admission of results of a
blood test into evidence. Petitioner Schmerber had been in an
automobile accident and taken to a hospital where he was arrested
for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He refused to
submit to a blood test. Yet, on the direction of the arresting officer,
a physician at the hospital withdrew a blood sample for chemical
analysis to determine the percentage of alcohol by weight in his body.
The Court held that the introduction of the compulsory blood test
into evidence was not violative of petitioner's privilege against self-
incrimination:
[W]e hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and
the withdrawal of blood and use of analysis in question in this
case did not involve compulsion to these ends.43
38 Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
39 Note 27 supra.
40452 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. 1970). The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in sustain-
ing the revocation of appellee's driver's license by the Department of Public
Safety, held that the lapse of time between the incident of driving ka motor vehicle
and the officer's request that appellee submit to a blood-alcohol test is not a valid
legal reason to refuse to submit to the test.
41 There has been only one other case to go before the Kentucky Court of
Appeals under Kentucky's implied consent legislation. In that case, Dep't of Public
Safety v. Bell, 453 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1970), the Court held that judicial review of
an administrative order is proper when an aggrieved party is in literal compliance
with the special statutory provisions in an attempt to have his operators license
restored, and when the Department of Public Safety is afforded reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard.
42384 U.S. 757 (1966).
431Id. at 761,
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The Court distinguished between the protection of an accused's
communications of a testimonial nature and the use of an accused's
body as the source of real physical evidence,44 which is not within
the protection of the fifth amendment. Thus, a defendant may be
required to submit to finger-printing, photographing or measurements,
and he may be compelled to write or speak for identification, to
appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a
certain gesture.45 Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the five man
majority, admitted that the evidence from a blood test was an
incriminating product of compulsion.46 Thus a questionable distinction
was established.
The Court's narrow construction of the self-incrimination privilege
was strongly criticized in a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black,
in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined.47 Without altering the historical
concept of the scope of this privilege,48 Justice Black was able to find
that the evidence obtained from the blood tests were of a testimonial
or communicative nature. It was from this dissent that Judge Osborne
of the Kentucky Court of Appeals found support for his position:
[T]he compulsory extraction of petitioner's blood for analysis so
that the person who analyzed it could give evidence to convict him
had both a 'testimonial' and 'communicative nature.' . . . The
analysis of the blood was to supply information to enable a witness
to communicate to the court .... [The majority] concedes ...
that the fifth amendment bars a statute from compelling a person
to produce papers that might tend to incriminate him. It is a
strange hierarchy of values that allows a state to extract a human
being's blood to convict him ...but proscribes compelled pro-
duction of his lifeless papers . . .49
44 Real evidence is defined as "evidence furnished by things themselves, on
view or inspection, as distinguished from a description of them by a mouth of a
witness." BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
45 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
The distinction which has emerged . . . is that the privilege is a bar
against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence'
does not violate it. Id.
48 Id. at 765.
47 Id. at 773-78 (dissenting opinion). See also 384 U.S. at 772 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting), 384 U.S. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
48 The decision in this area which has long been the recognized authority is
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), which held:
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material. Id. at 252-53.49 Dep't of Public'Safety v. Brent, 452 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Ky. 1970) (Osborne,
J., concurring), quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 774-75 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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Even if the Kentucky Court of Appeals does hold that compulsion
to submit to a blood test violates the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion (the coercion being revocation of the driver's license), the court
will be faced with the issue of consent. As previously stated, "implied
consent" legislation has been upheld in other jurisdictions on the theory
that the license to drive is a privilege granted by the state subject
to such conditions as the state may impose in the interest of public
safety and welfare. But can the state condition a privilege upon a
waiver of a constitutional right, i.e., the right not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself? Under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions:
[W]hatever an express constitutional provision forbids govern-
ment to do directly it equally forbids government to do indirectly.
As a consequence, it seems to follow that the [fifth] amendment
forbids the government to condition its largess on the willingness
of the petitioner to surrender a right which he would otherwise be
entitled to exercise .... 50
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Frost & Frost
Trucking Company v. Railroad Commission:51
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip
the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to
uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the
guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege
which the state threatens otherwise to withhold .... If the state
may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition
of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It
is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of
the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.5 2
The central concern, of course, is to achieve a balance between
the desire to preserve individual liberty and the desire to prevent
conduct that is socially harmful. The policy considerations behind
implied consent laws are great. Although they do not alter the basic
method of initially detecting the drunken driver, the laws are a
desirable method of gathering scientifically reliable evidence once
the initial contact has been made. In the past, failure to convict has
generally been due to the inability to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the driver was intoxicated. With the definite evidence
now being obtained as a result of the enactment of implied consent
50 Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-46 (1968).
51271 U.S. 583 (1926).52 Id. at 593-94.
[Vol. 59
Co2vAENTs
legislation, the law's most important effect will be to increase the
number of convictions and thus deter the public from driving after
drinking by increasing the fear in a potential drinking driver that he
may be convicted for the offense if apprehended. Another benefit of
these statutes is that, with the imprecision of subjective observation
replaced by objective evidence, the innocent individual is fully
protected and the impaired driver is justly adjudicated guilty.
On the other side is the opinion expressed by Judge Osborne that
coercion to obtain physical evidence violates the right against self-
incrimination. The rationale behind this privilege is that the words
of the accused could well be unreliable when obtained by compulsory
process. But the accuracy of physical evidence, in this case blood
alcohol content, is in no way affected by the compulsion involved.
Therefore, the need to remove the drinking driver from the state's
highways requires that the Kentucky Court of Appeals uphold the
constitutionality of Kentucky's implied consent statute against fifth
amendment challenges, as have the courts of other jurisdictions. 53
Taft A. McKinstry
CoNs rrrONAL LAw-THE PowER OF A GOVERNOR TO PROCLAIM Ma-
TL&. LAw AND USE STATE MLrTARY FORCES TO SUPPRESS CANTUS
DEMONSrRATION.-On April 30, 1970 the war in Indochina came home.
It exploded on a thousand' college and university campuses as the
shock waves of outrage swept the country following the President's
announcement of the invasion of Cambodia by the Armed Forces of
the United States.2 While the President attempted to head off the
constitutional crisis he had created by his unilateral action,3 Americans,
53 See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
1 The magnitude of the reaction is not exaggerated. NEwswEEK, May 18,
1970, at 28.
2 On April 30, 1970, the President in a nationally televised speech, an-
nounced that 20 000 American troops had joined South Vietnamese forces in an
invasion of Cambodia. The stated purpose of the invasion was the destruction of
enemy sanctuaries in that country. N wswYP- May 11, 1970, at 22-28. NEws-
wEEE, May 25, 1970, at 29. The invasion was such an unexpected shock to the
American people because just ten days before in another televised speech, the
President had announced that he would withdraw an additional 150,000 troops
from South Vietnam over the following twelve months. NEWswEEK, May 4, 1970,
at 21-22. Only two days before the announced invasion. Secretary of State William
Rogers reassured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States
would not engage in ground military operations in Cambodia. NEwswEr, May 11,
1970, at 23.
3 The President had not consulted Congress before he ordered the invasion
of Cambodia by American military forces. He had not even informed members
(Continued on next page)
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